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JUDICIAL REACTION TO EVIDENCE
OBTAINED BY HARSH AND UNUSUAL MEANS
GENE HAISLIP

I.
Introduction
The question with which this paper will be concerned is the
nature of the judicial reaction to the new potentialities which
science holds for the further extension of the "eye and finger"
of the government, particularly as regards their scrutiny of the
person accused of a crime. More specifically we shall consider
what presently is and what probably will be the court's answer
to the accused's plea for the sanctity of his person from the
probing instrumentalities of a police authority newly awakened
to the fact finding advantages which modern technology can
offer.
No adequate means presently exist with which to protect
an individual helplessly in the clutches of a police power
determined to wring from him the facts which it desires to know
or to have believed. But whereas such a procedure cannot
result in a condemnation, the accused may seek his succor in
the court in which he is tried. This power of the court was
clearly recognized in the case of Weeks v. United States . In this
case the Supreme Court refused to entertain certain incriminating facts which were obtained from the accused by what the
court considered to be illegal means. In effect the court has,
by this ruling and its subsequent ramifications, established its
authority over the exercise of police power to the extent of
determining what uses of the power can be fruitful in producing
legally competent evidence which will be received at trial. It
therefore becomes crucial for the exercise of police power to
determine whether or not any given method of collecting
evidence is illegal. As a consequence such a determination can
1 232 U.S. 383 (1913).
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also be decisive of the degree of efficiency with which the
criminal law will be administered.
The principal legal concepts which are of most relevance to
the issue with which we will be concerned are those expressed
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons...
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. 2 . . . nor shall [any person] be compelled in
any criminal case, to be witness against himself. s
It is by application of these principles, together with their
state counterparts and more indirectly the Fourteenth Amendment, that the problem of science and the suspect will be
decided.
The following analysis purports to be only a cursory
examination of the subject and its possible implications. The
emphasis will be placed on the federal and Supreme Court
decisions for the reason that (1) the Supreme Court has announced in the recent case of Mapp v. Ohio 4 that all illegally
obtained evidence will be inadmissible in any court in the
United States, (2) the relevant provisions of the Constitution
are to be found in duplicate in most of the states, (3) it is
established that the Fourth Amendment applies to the states by
means of the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment5 and (4) there is strong evidence that the states will either
follow the lead of the Supreme Court in this field or that they
will be forced to do so by application of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
One further note of caution, before proceeding, is that one
cannot yet pretend to draw any conclusions as to what the
general law governing the subject matter presently is. First of
all there are not enough decided cases to support such a conclusion and secondly it would require a dubious supposition
2

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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as to the relationship of the federal and state precedents. This
then is intended to be only an analysis of the judicial reaction
to the problem. The important element is that the advent of
new circumstances has necessitated a re-examination and a
further definition of the two greatest procedural protections of
the individual.
II.
Background
The ancient law governing the extent to which the individual's person could be scrutinized is well settled. The conventional limitations on the application of the Fifth Amendment are stated in the case of Holt v. United States in which the
court said:
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him; not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material. 6
It has therefore followed that evidence obtained by a compulsory
examination of the accused does not violate the provisions of
the Fifth Amendment.
In a similar manner the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against illegal search and seizure has always been held not to
apply in cases where there has been a valid arrest. The court
held in the case of United States v. Rabinowitz:
The right to search the person incident to an arrest has
been recognized in this country and in England. Where one
had been placed in the custody of the law by valid action
of officers it was not unreasonable to search him. 7
This exception to the general rule has been to some degree
eroded by time and circumstance and the problems with which
we shall deal. It is now recognized that there may be exceptions
6 218 U.S. 245, 246 (1910); see also, United States v. McFarland, 150 F.2d 593

(D. C. Cir. 1945).
7 339 U.S. 56, 57 (1950); see also, Weeks v. United States, supranote 1;Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
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to the exception and the now prevailing attitude of the courts
is better expressed by the court in Charles v. United States:
...Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to
the physical dominion of the law, inspection of his person,
regardless of purpose, cannot be deemed unlawful...
unless they violate the dictates of reason either because of
their number or their manner of perpetration. 8
The question which is not answered by this general rule is what
kind of examination will be deemed reasonable and what kinds
not. The previously unknown use of scientific methods of
investigation and the high esteem in which the public'holds its
proofs have made this decision one of considerable judicial
difficulty and importance, not so much in the light of present
usage but in regard to future possibilities. The question then
may be concretely stated as this-assuming a valid arrest, what
is the judicial criterion for an acceptable scientific examination
of the person?
In the case of United States v. Willis9 the defendant was
validly arrested by federal officers upon grounds of reasonable
suspicion of having carried and consumed narcotics. The
defendant was then forcibly strapped to a table and his stomach
was pumped by a qualified physican. A quantity of dope was
recovered and subsequently used in evidence. On appeal, the
court tiraded to some length as to the injustice and brutality of
this examination:
It is rather difficult to reason one into the conclusion
that the sacred person may be so violated, over the protests
of that person, as to take from the stomach without consent
and without warrant.
We may venture a little further into the realm of conjecture ... if a search such as was made in the instant case may
be approved, would it not likewise follow that if the
narcotics after being swallowed had passed from the stomach to the blood stream, some officers might feel it incumbent upon them to drain the defendant of part of his life's
blood in an effort to discover the hidden evidence. 1o
8 278 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1960).
9 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Calif. 1949).
10 Id. at 748.
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This latter paragraph will seem particularly ludicrous in the
light of more recent Supreme Court decisions although it would
seem that there is something generally nauseating to judges
about stomach pumping.
the police entered the
In the case of Rochin v. California, 3L
defendant's house without a warrant and came upon him in his
bedroom whereupon they preceived on a night stand a number
of capsules which they reasonably believed to be narcotics. The
defendant grabbed these capsules and put them in his mouth.
A struggle ensued in which the police attempted unsuccessfully
to recover the capsules. When it was apparent that they had
failed they arrested the defendant and rushed him to a hospital
where his stomach was pumped against his will and a quantity
of narcotics was thereby recovered. The defendant was convicted largely on the strength of this evidence. The case came
before the Supreme Court on the charge that the petitioner
had been deprived of due process of law. The court held:
. . . This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to
open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents of the government to obtain evidence is
bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation. 12
The question arises as to exactly what the court's objection was
to this line of procedure. It is obvious from the case of Wolf v.
Colorado'3 that mere illegal search and seizure on the part of
the state was not, at the time of the Rochin case, a sufficient
ground for setting aside a conviction.
It seems to be well established that had the officers come
upon the defendant with reasonable grounds of suspicion that
they would have been justified in their attempt to retrieve the
capsules from the defendant's mouth. Such was the set of facts
in the case of Espinoza v. United States1 4 in which the court
"

342 U.S. 165 (1952).

12

Id. at 209.

13

Supra note 5.

14

278 F.2d 802 (SdrCir. 1960).
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upheld this action on the part of federal officers. The question
then arises as to whether the officers would have been justified in pumping the accused's stomach had they failed to
recover the capsules from his mouth. Under the lower court
precedent of United States v. Willis15 they would not. Although in the Rochin case16 the Supreme Court objected to
the "whole line of procedure" on the part of the state officers,
it is fairly clear in the dicta that the major objection was not
to the illegal entry and search without a warrant but rather
to the subsequent stomach pumping.
III.
Present Criterion
Some five years later the case of Breithaupt v. Abram 7 came
before the Supreme Court. In that case the defendant was
involved in an automobile accident and while in a state of
unconsciousness following the accident, police officers took
from him a blood sample to use as evidence in convicting him
of a manslaughter charge. The defendant objected to this
unwarranted taking of his blood without his consent and cited
the Rochin case as supporting precedent. The court however
distinguished the two cases on the following grounds:
Basically the distinction [between the Rochin and
Breithaupt cases] rests on the fact that there is nothing
"brutal" and "offensive" in the taking of a sample of blood
when done.... under the protective eye of a physician. 18
The court also made much over the fact that some 44 states use
blood testing as a means of determining intoxication and that
the accuracy of the test is well recognized in medical circles.
The case therefore evolves a threefold criterion on which to
validate such probings: (1) that no "brutal" or "offensive"
means be employed in the examination, and (2) that the examination be administered by trained personnel, and (3) that the
results of the examination have a high degree of certainty.
15 Supra note 9.
18 Supra note 11.
17

352 U.S. 43 (1957).

1-4Id. at 410.
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The earlier case of Leyra v. Denno1' reflects also the same
attitude on the part of the Supreme Court. Although the case
is not formally classified as one dealing with the validation of a
scientific examination of the person, it nevertheless reflects a
common element. Here the accused was validly arrested as a
murder suspect in the slaying of his parents. While under
police custody he was examined and questioned for some hours
by a psychiatrist. At the end of the examination the defendant
had confessed to the murders. With sweeping statements of
disapproval the court reversed the case on the grounds that the
confession was coerced. So little faith did the court have in the
examination that it seems never to have occurred to it that, at
least from the psychiatrist's point of view, he had considered
himself to be conducting a reliable and scientific examination.
It is however widely known that the present value of such
findings are in great dispute and laymen in general do not have
as much confidence in this type of examination as they do in a
chemical analysis. For this reason the proceedings, although
conducted by an expert and seemingly neither brutal nor
offensive, failed completely to meet the requirement that the
results of an examination have a high degree of certainty.
An analysis of the later decisions shows that the courts have
more or less consciously applied this threefold criterion. In the
case of UnitedStates v. Townsend20the defendant was arrested on
a charge of rape and was taken to the police station where a
number of officers forcibly removed his trousers and swabbed
his penis with cotton, thereby obtaining evidence of blood
stains which they sought to use at trial. The court, in condemning the examination, cited the fact that, "the police failed
to make any tests which might have established the source or
nature of the blood. .. " The court then stated:
. . . the swabbing of the penis by law enforcement officers
is-by no means standard operating procedure... The use
of force to compel an individual to submit to such an
invasion of his privacy is certainly conduct which shocks
the conscience
21
19
20
21

347 U.S. 556 (1954).
151 F.Supp. 378 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Id. at 387.
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These criticisms point out that the examination in question
failed to qualify for validation in at least two particulars: (1) the
results of the examination did not have a high degree of
certainty, and (2) the examination was not administered by
trained personnel.
In the case of Blackford v. United States22 the defendant was
reasonably suspected of concealing narcotics in his rectum and
over his protest he was forcibly undressed and held while a
doctor probed the rectum and recovered the narcotics. Of this
the court said:
The precise knowledge of what and how much was where,
the use of only slight force, the handling of the examination by qualified doctors, with the use of scientific procedures, and under sanitary conditions, all militate against
finding this search and seizure to be unreasonable. 23
The court, in essence, pointed out the compliance of the examination with each aspect of the necessary criterion. The case of
Murgia v. United States24 involved a more or less identical
situation and was likewise validated by the court.
Thus far it would appear that the controversy over such
scientific invasions of the person has dissipated and settled into
a set of workable judicial rules. In regard to two of the aspects
of the threefold criterion, i.e. the requirement of reliable results
and the use of scientific methods and personnel, this picture of
judicial unity would seem to be an accurate representation.
But it is when we come to the third requirement, that of the
absence of the use of "brutal and offensive" means, that one
clearly sees the disunity and misunderstanding which exist
among the judiciary. In fact the dicta of the various cases show
that the courts and justices are acting from antithetical philosophies.

23

247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 753.

24

285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960).

22
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IV.
The "Brutal" or "Offensive" Test
The obvious difficulties entailed in a uniform application
and understanding of so vague a requirement that an examination be conducted without "brutal" or "offensive" means
arise from the fact that whether or not a procedure is "brutal"
or "offensive" is a matter of subjective sentiment. In the
dissenting opinion of the Breithaupt25 case, Justices Warren,
Douglas and Black were of the view that, "Only personal
reaction to the stomach pump and the blood test can distinguish . .. " the case from the Rochin decision. Yet the body of
the court insisted that in so ruling in the Breithauptcase that it
was not overruling the Rochin decision. But in view of the fact
that the stomach pumping in the Rochin case was administered
by a qualified physician and that the results of this type of
examination are highly conclusive it would appear that the only
valid distinction between the two cases rests on the fact that
the court considered the forced stomach pumping in Rochin to
be "brutal" and "offensive" as compared with the nicety of
taking blood from an unconscious suspect. It is worthy of note
that the court in the previously cited case of United States v.
Willis2 6 considered that, "to drain the defendant of part of his
life's blood. . . " was a great deal more heinous than pumping
his stomach.
What therefore is "brutal" or "offensive" conduct in
problems of this nature? One cannot escape the impression
from a reading of the Rochin case that the court had before it
the conjured image of a lone and helpless man strong-armed
and bullied into regurgitating his stomach's contents, a
repulsive show of brute police power. What would have been
the conjured image had Rochin been requested to submit to the
stomach pumping and upon his refusal had been ordered to
submit to the examination whereby he calmly reclined on the
table and resigned himself to the methodical procedures of the
attending physician? Would this too have been brutal and
offensive? To quote from the previously cited case of Murgia v.
United States:
25
26

Supra note 17.
Supra note 9.
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At the hospital Agent Scott asked Murgia to remove
his trousers and Murgia declined to do so, upon which
Agent Scott said, "Bend over and remove your trousers".
Murgia thereupon complied. Dr. Milligan then probed the
rectum with his finger and withdrew the red balloon which
contained the heroin. Thus no question arises herein under
the "brutal and offensive treatment" doctrine re-emphasized
recently by the Supreme Court.2 7
From this statement it is clear that the court saw no problem of
"brutal" and "offensive" treatment because of the fact that no
physical force was necessary to subdue the accused. The same
conclusion was reached by the court in Blackford v. United
States28 because of the necessity of using "only slight force" to
subdue the defendant. In the Breithaupt case of course no
force waro necessary since the defendant was unconscious.
Must we therefore conclude that the applicability of the
"brutal and offensive treatment" doctrine depends on the
degree of force necessary to be exerted in order to suppress the
defendant's will? This would certainly appear to be a most
injudicious rule. To quote again from the case of United States
v. Townsend in which the defendant's penis was forcibly
swabbed:
... For basically, what is "offensive" herein is that the
suspect was compelled by police authorities to submit to the
test involved. To say otherwise is to say that hardened
criminals willing to risk struggle with the police could
successfully overcome the right 6f law enforcement officers
to obtain evidence while less aggressive suspects ... could
be compelled to submit to the identical tests. 2 9
Obviously the court did not see or could not believe the logical
implications of the earlier Supreme Court decisions. The
holding in the case is therefore identical with the dicta found in
the dissenting opinion of the Breithaupt case:
28

Supra note 24 at 16.
Supra note 22.

29

Supra note 20 at 388.

27
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I cannot see that it should make any difference whether
one states unequivocally that he objects or resorts to
physical violence in protest... 30
The only other explanation of the Rochin and Breithaupt
decisions would be that the court did not mean to equate
"brutal and offensive treatment" with the quantum of force
necessary to subdue the defendant but rather with the pumping
of stomachs as distinguished from the taking of blood regardless of the force involved. We must then ask the question:
Is the momentary taste of vomit so much worse than the
prick of a needle or the probing of the rectum that it should
mean the difference between, freedom and confinement or the
establishment of guilt and innocence? When measured in
terms of such weighty matters the differences between these
types of examinations would dearly seem to be negligible.
At this point in our exposition it is dear that the misunderstanding and confusion which exist among the judiciary goes
to the very heart of the matter. It is not to be expected that the
courts will continue long in their handling of these matters
before the unjust implications of the cases as they now stand
will have to be dealt with one way or another. Nor can they
long afford to continue in this state of confusion if police
abuses are to be corrected. To quote Justice Clark:
... Unpredictal le reversals on dissimilar fact situations
are not likely t curb the zeal of those police and prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a high percentage
of successful prosecutions.31
The ultimate issue with which the courts will be faced is
whether or not a validly arrested person may be required to submit to any scientific examination and if so then how will the
line be drawn as to what kinds of scientific examinations may be
given. We may assume that if it be decided that an accused may
be given certain kinds of examinations without his consent
then the present absurdity will be dispensed with. It will make
no difference how much force will have to be used to give the
accused the examination. We may also assume that if certain
30
32

Supra note 17 at 413.
Irvine v. People of California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954).
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given without the accused's consent
still be subject to the two generally
that their results have a high degree of
be conducted by qualified personnel.
V.

AntitheticalPoints of View
Thus far we have two basically contradictory points of view
represented by the Rochin and Breithaupt cases. One of these
two cases will become the basis for the future rulings while the
other will become a useless precedent either in fact, by being
distinguished to death, or by actual repudiation. The antithetical points of view regarding the scientific scrutinizing of
the person are well reflected and stated in the two cases. From
the concurring opinion of Justice Black in the Rochin case we
have the following statement:
I think a person is compelled to be a witness against himself not only when he is compelled to testify, but also when
as here, incriminating evidence is forcibly taken from him
by the contrivance of modern science."
Here science is viewed as not belonging in the realm of criminal
prosecution or at least not in this phase of it. For a forceful
statement of the other view we have but to turn to the dicta of
the Breithaupt case:
Modern community living requires modern scientific methods of crime detection lest the public go unprotected ...
As against the right of the individual that his person be
held inviolable . . . must be set the interests of society ...
And the more so since the test likewise may establish
innocence, thus affording protection against the treachery
of judgment based on one or more of the senses."
Now therefore we have the broadest questions of human
concern before us: How to make a beneficial use of power. As
the wheels of science continue to grind out new and more
powerful devices in every area they unfortunately do not grind
32

Supra note 11 at 211.

33 Supra note 17 at 413.
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out mandates or even formulas for their proper use. These
problems are only now beginning to lap against the ancient
precepts of the law. It is therefore natural that they produce
temporary confusion and uncertainty. The scientific procedures involved in the cases with which we have dealt represent only the infancy of this field of application. It may be
reasonably anticipated that in time advances in the field of
medicine, psychology, chemistry and neurology -will be able to
produce reliable and objective lie detector tests, truth serums
and the like. For this reason and for the reason of the present
confusion on the subject it is perhaps worth while to consider
the merits of the conflicting points of view.
As already indicated the principal objection to the giving of
a compulsory scientific examination has been that it violates the
privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth
Amendment. This line of thought is represented in the Supreme
Court by Justices Black, Douglas and Warren, although in a
continuous line of decisions the court has held that the amendment applies only to verbal communications. 34Even so the fact
remains that the reason for making such a distinction is a
flimsy one at best and one which, given the right court, might
be easily torn away. The basic mandate of the Fifth Amendment as these Justices have grasped, is that the defendant's will
be not bent against his own cause, or stated another way, that
the defendant is not a source from which evidence may be
obtained without his cooperation. There can be no real
distinction between forcing words from the accused's mouth
and forcing blood from his veins unless it be for reasons which
go behind the Fifth Amendment. It can be safely assumed
however, that the Fifth Amendment was drafted with verbal
communications in mind for the reason that the framers of the
amendment did not at that time imagine that there could by any
other means of self-incrimination. Therefore if the Fifth
Amendment is to be applied to the kind of probings under
consideration, it can only be applied by means of judicial
interpretation. This would require going behind the amendment in search of the intent of its framers and the nature of the
evils which they sought to thereby remedy.
34

Other than the cases already cited is the closely related case of United States v.
Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1955) in which the compulsory taking offingerprints after a valid arrest was held not to violate the Fifth Amendment.
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VI.
The Fifth Amendment Objection
We may begin this inquiry by first seeking the origin of the
Fifth Amendment and thereby exposing the causes which gave
rise to it. According to Professor Wigmore's concise and well
documented account of the origin of the Fifth Amendment 3
the objection to compulsory self-incrimination first arose
because of the abusive ecclesiastic ex officio proceedings by
the Court of Star Chamber. The ex officio proceeding provided that an accused could only be made to answer after he
had been duly charged by a number of witnesses or had become
publicly notorious. The abuses of the Star Chamber were of
two kinds, the first of which according to Professor Wigmore
was that in practice the Court of Star Chamber dropped the
requirement that the defendant could not be compelled to
answer until some evidence or witnesses were first produced.
In so doing, they used the compulsion merely as a means to
explore at will and at random into the life of whomever it so
pleased them to choose as a victim, "inthe speculation of
finding something chargeable".36 The second abuse was
adopted directly from the ecclesiastical inquisition and consisted in torturing the accused into answering. 37 Needless to
say this frequently resulted in obtaining the desired results
regardless of the truth.38 By 1641 the English Parliament
became so disgusted with the Star Chamber that it was abolished and with it, according to Bentham, "every distinguishable
feature of a system of procedure directed at such ends".39 This
statute and its subsequent development at law resulted in the
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
The historical basis on which the Fifth Amendment is
therefore predicated is to be found in two major objections:
35 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (3rd ed. 1940).

36 bid.
37
38

Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Sel.Incrimination
Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1930).
A dear indication of this is to be found in Bacon's notes to wit: "Upon these

interrogatories, Peacham was examined before torture, between torture, and
after torture; nothing could be drawn from him, he still persisted in his
obstinate and inexcusable denials and former answers." Corwin, Ibid.
39 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (3rd ed. 1940), quoting from Bentham's
Rationale ofJudicial Evidence (at p. 283).
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(1) the wanton arrest, imprisonment and examination of persons without well-founded suspicion or charges and (2) the unreliability of the evidence and admissions obtained by coercing
the accused. The former objection is tied to the general axiom
of Anglo-American law that the individual is above the reproach of the law until there is just reason to suspect his guilt.
This objection is .presently met by the law of warrants and
arrests and does not concern the problem at hand. The latter
objection is tied to the general axiom that it is better that the
guilty go freethan thattheinnocent should suffer, or more exactly
that it is better to make law enforcement more difficult than
that innocent persons should suffer conviction because of
forced and fabricated admissions obtained by over-zealous
prosecutors. This latter objection is met almost exclusively by
the application of the Fifth Amendment and to this end it
continues to be of great value.
Returning to the question of whether or not the Fifth
Amendment should be applied to the scientific probings of an
accused we see that the protection which the Fifth Amendment
was created to afford is not violated by such examinations for
the reason that the validity of the evidence so obtained may be
objectively appraised. Whereas over-zealous prosecutors could
by means of force "persuade" an accused that he was drunk
(for example), they cannot persuade his blood to register a
certain percentage of alcohol. The element of unreliability is
not present in the evidence so obtained, provided, however,
that the courts continue to adhere to the requirements of testing
which are presently agreed upon.
VII.
The Necessity of Further Rules and Some Tentative Suggestions
It is probable also that the Fifth Amendment was created
not only to do away with unreliable aspects of the evidence
obtained by coercion but also with the brutality of the methods
which it might become necessary to use on a stubborn suspect,
i.e. torture. This fact is no doubt responsible for the "brutal
and offensive" doctrine which the court has announced. In
order to meet this objection without ending up in the present
logical absurdity already mentioned i.e. that the more uncooperative suspects may avoid the tests by putting up enough of
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a struggle, it will be necessary to formulate additional rules.
The newly enacted Virginia statute 40 regarding the taking of
blood from drunken driving suspects provides an admirable
means to solve this dilemma. The coercing incentive for taking
the test is completely uniform and neither brutal or offensive. 4
A reasonable solution to the problem at hand would be to
inform the suspect that if he refuses to submit to the examination that such refusal will raise a rebuttable presumption of
his guilt. The suspect may then make his election.
Now it is necessary to return to the possible "brutality" of
the examination itself. It is certainly not to be supposed that
the ideals of Anglo-American law could ever tolerate the
forcing of a major operation on an individual solely for the
sake of obtaining evidence. For this reason it will be necessary
to draw limits on the possible kinds of examinations which an
accused may be subjected to. It would seem that a workable
and otherwise sensible rule would be to require that the accused
choose between raising a rebuttable presumption of guilt
against himself or submit to any such examination as a reasonable man, under valid arrest with nothing to hide, would consent to in order to clear himself of the charges involved-short
of any examination which would result in a permanent injury
or prolonged suffering. This latter clause would take into
account any unique or unusual condition or phobia of the
particular individual. Such a rule would answer all objections
which were sought to be cured by the Fifth Amendment and at
the same time satisfy the final requirements of the Fourth
Amendment in this field that a search of the person must be
reasonable.4 2 If it be added to the rule that the evidence so
obtained be open to use by the defendant then all of the
benefits of this new field of evidence of which the court spoke
in the Breithaupt case are preserved not only for the protection
of society but as well for the individual.
40
41

42

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55-59 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1960, Supp. 1962).
Reference here is made to the suspension of driver's license under VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.1-55 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1960, Supp. 1962) for failure to submit to
blood testing.
Blackford v. United States, supra note 22 at 749; Charles v. United States, supra
note 8 at 389.
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VIII.
Last Objections Answered
There remains but one further vocalized reason for which it
is claimed the Fifth Amendment exists and although not
found in the formative history of the amendment it may be
argued that it exists nevertheless in the minds of some of the
judiciary. To quote the statement of Justice Frankfurter from
the Rochin case:
Use of involuntary verbal confessions in . . . criminal
trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their
unreliability. Coerced confessions offend the community's
sense of fair play ... 43
Unless the allusion to "fair play" be in reference to the matters
which have already been dealt and dispensed with, e.g. in the
use of torture, then the statement can only mean that it should
be one of the rules of law enforcement that guilty persons be
given a fair chance to escape the penalties of their crimes. This
would ignore the basic principle that the criminal law is
construed so as to protect those of the class of accused persons
who may be innocent. In essence, the law recognizes that not
all of the persons accused of crimes will be guilty of these crimes
and therefore, in the interest of protecting such innocent persons from conviction, those means of gathering evidence which
are unreliable should be prohibited. Furthermore all means of
gathering evidence which are inhumane should be prohibited
for the protection of both guilty and innocent suspects. So
analyzed, the basis of the criminal law is only to protect guilty
suspects from inhumane treatment even though in the interest
of innocent suspects, further protections are granted to the
class of suspects as a whole. Therefore when the element of
uncertainty as to the evidence obtained is absent and when the
element of inhumane means of obtaining such evidence is
absent, then the prohibition should be absent since it serves no
longer to protect the innocent from conviction or to protect
either class from cruel treatment. To pump any further concept
of "fair play" into the prohibition would be to radically alter
43 Supra note 11 at 210.
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the basis of the criminal law and serve only the interests of the
guilty and was therefore probably not the intention of the
author of the above quoted statement.
Ix.
Concluding Remarks
The twentieth century has seen the growing refinement and
application of the scientific method sometimes with horror
although most frequently with delight. The new powers which
have thereby come into being whether for massive destruction
or for fact finding offer great problems in the field of social
application. These problems have been viewed with foreboding
in many quarters and are reflected generally in contemporary
letters. The writings of Aldous Huxley, George Orwell and
Arthur Koestler, to mention but a few, have with dexterity
portrayed the scientific machinery of the police state crushing
out the resistance of the accused individual. The present
judicial hesitations to recognize a police power armed with
science are but echoes of this single line of foreboding based
especially on the fear of usage as manifest in the modern
totalitarian state. Surely it is true that the days of the individual's integrity are numbered when a set of facts such as
existed in the Rochin case go uncorrected. But the principal
objection there was due to an error of another kind which the
court has since corrected in the Mapp case. In conclusion it is
demonstrated that all historical and contemporary objections
to the use of the scientific scrutiny of the accused may be
answered and yet the benefits of the method preserved. If the
courts continue to require that such examinations be conducted
by trained personnel and that their results carry a high degree of
certainty and if the legislatures further provide for a uniform
and humane means of coercing suspects, then it would seem
that any scientific probing for evidence reasonably commensurate with the value of the evidence sought, will not
violate the principles and purposes of the Constitution. A
power is no better or worse than the persons or institutions
which supervise its employment.

